José was informed he would pitch five innings or 80 pitches, whichever happened to come first, and the game was his to control.He was told to have fun.The scout was the man who witnessed him signing his professional contract, and now he was about to see the most important appearance of his brief baseball career.He had successfully reached his overambitious goal, and after his performance in camp was now considered one of the top pitching prospects in the entire system.Despite the healthy bonus acquired when he signed his professional deal, his father never left his place of employment, wanting to instill in his son the value of hard work even in the face of excess reward.The family home remained in the same location, although with the new renovations and the new automobile parked out front, it looked slightly incongruous in the surrounding neighborhood.That aside, José’s financial windfall wasn’t on display, with the majority of the funds set aside for the education of his four younger siblings and the security of his family.The money wasn’t worn around José’s neck or in his ear, he wasn’t riding in style, and he wasn’t sending lavish gifts to his girl.Teenagers and money can be a dangerous cocktail, and when available funds exceed pedestrian allowances, an appetite for frivolous spending can bleed a player’s bank account in short order.But what happens when cultural assimilation fails?Simply put, not only will the player fail on the field, but also quite often the player will fail off of it.Imagine a young player from a rough background who possesses little in the way of education or social skills.In his native region, the basic laws we adhere to in the United States are, at best, guidelines, so some distinctions between right and wrong have not been learned.This isn’t unique to any one region or group of people, and it should be noted that not every player who originates from a difficult socioeconomic background will fail to comprehend the basic tenets of right and wrong.When the results weren’t there, he didn’t wear the failure and never lost his focus.His command still needed refinement, his slider needed more velocity and tilt, and his feel for sequencing and situation wasn’t ready for prime time.In other words, José might have a bright future, and scouts and prognosticators might adore his projection, but the present was anything but perfect and the developmental process still had a long road ahead.With José struggling to adjust to yet another new environment and a new set of coaches, it wasn’t surprising that the psychological elements at play were beginning to expand in size and sizzle.The slider had become a soft slurve with more sweep than sharp break, showing hitters a beach ball over the plate when José missed his spots.At the team facility, José worked with the organization’s roving pitching coordinator, watched video of his starts, and tried to rediscover his delivery and release point.In fact, the arm itself was fine, just as it had been fine during year one, with the true culprit lying between José’s ears.The move to the bullpen was to get José into more games, thereby giving him more opportunities to rediscover his fastball command as well as the overall consistency of his delivery.The Greens development staff wanted to restore muscle memory through repetition.Pitchers get into trouble when they think about the individual characteristics of the physical process, rather than executing based on muscle memory.As is typical with starting pitchers working in relief, the fastball showed more giddyup than previously seen, working in bursts in the 93–96 mph range with comfort, although the movement on the pitch wasn’t as exciting.The slider had more velocity as well, thrown around 82–84 mph with tilt, but as with the fastball, the command just wasn’t sharp.Like the rest of his arsenal, the pitch was thrown with more velocity and as a result often arrived at the plate too firm.The results still weren’t overly impressive and command that once stood alongside the stuff itself was dragging down the overall effectiveness of the arsenal.The final line didn’t reflect the talent.A few positive outings at the end of the season gave the Greens some hope for the future, but on the whole, year four was a step back.José was pressing, thinking when the game requires execution without reflection.José’s mind had lost its connection to his body, and his mechanics and release point followed suit.It was a testament to his makeup that he didn’t seek sanctuary within himself, maintaining a willingness to accept criticism and instruction, taking his demotion to the bullpen as a step in the developmental process.The developmental plan would not be altered.It’s not uncommon for players to take criticism personally, using any pejorative connotation as material to build a barrier between themselves and the developmental staff.It’s the job of the development staff to find the right approach for each player, and to continue to refine that approach in order to reach that player.Those unwilling to accept and participate in the process will fail to maximize their potential.After a brief respite from baseball back in the Dominican Republic, José returned to the team’s stateside facility to continue his search for the fluid delivery that had originally brought the buscones to his doorstep.You couldn’t ask for a better starter’s physique, although now the question arose as to whether the prospect was better suited for relief or rotation.A legitimate case for either eventuality could have been made.Months of extra work had helped refine not only José’s delivery but his body as well, adding the strength necessary for the increased workload of year five.The goal was to establish an easy rhythm and maintain a good line to the plate, while also better utilizing the strengthened lower body in the delivery.In addition, the development staff added a fastball variation to the mix, slowly adding a cut fastball to José’s repertoire, but limiting the number of cutters thrown at any given time.The cutter wasn’t added to replace the changeup against lefties, but rather to add another velocity pitch to the mix in order to induce weak contact and to help enhance the overall effectiveness of the much slower changeup, a pitch that wasn’t utilized as often in year four.Not wanting to overwhelm José with a complete arsenal overhaul, the plan to bring the curveball back was put on the back burner, focusing instead on the development of the cutter and the refinement of the slider and changeup.The team graded the pitch in the 50/55 range, with projections of its becoming another plus pitch.More often than not, it looked more like a poor slider than a proper cut fastball.It was a work in progress.He kept reminding himself not to think.The big Dominican, now affectionately dubbed Astro by some of his teammates, handled the pressure of the promotion without much visible effect, taking the ball every fifth day and going to work.His cultural assimilation was almost complete.His English was nearly fluent, his awareness of the culture around him was superior to that of some of his North American teammates, and his place within that culture was firmly established.For the rest of the minor league season, José’s results were finally consistent with his ability.His feel for sequence and situation enhanced the raw stuff beyond its grade, and as his command continued to improve, the competition was overwhelmed by the complete package.A few days before August became September, the phone rang at the home of José’s family in the Dominican Republic.With a slight tremble in his voice, he thanked José’s parents for their commitment to their son and for all the sacrifices they had made in order to push him beyond the surroundings he was born into.The director’s heartfelt statements were met with sobs, as both José’s mother and father wept uncontrollably, overwhelmed with pride and excitement for their eldest son.Although a more detailed call regarding logistics would need to be made later that day, this call was the director’s first priority.Without them, this day would not have been possible, and it was only fair that the father who had worked until his hands bled, day after day, year after year, should be the one to call his son and tell him, Son, you did it.How Can We Evaluate General Managers?What might have occurred to the Red Sox and Rangers on the way to hiring Epstein and Daniels is that experience only matters if one has a tangible method of evaluating how experience affects performance.How can we, then, find a way to evaluate general managers objectively within their own context?Similarly, there are certain things that are under a general manager’s control, and many more that are not.We can, at best, attempt to gauge where a general manager will have the most influence on his team.There are some statistics that can help, even if they cannot provide us with a definitive evaluation.Shawn Hoffman at Baseball Prospectus addressed some of these concerns, noting that a team’s 90th win is inherently more valuable than, say, a team’s 60th win, and that the issue shouldn’t be whether a team such as the Yankees has a payroll of $200 million or $100 million, but rather, if it is the higher figure, how well the $200 million is spent.Still, concerns remain.A player might make the major league minimum one season and in the next earn significantly more after winning an arbitration case, while he still provides the same value.Too much of the former can be counterproductive, at least in terms of wooing and winning a fan base.Neither Maybin nor Miller have reached the ceiling once projected for them, and indeed, neither of the two are still with the Marlins.They were also an aesthetic failure, as exemplified by center field, where the Fish could not be bothered to hire a quality center fielder.Since trading Juan Pierre in December, 2005, the club has employed one patchwork solution after another, kicking the position from Reggie Abercrombie to Alfredo Amezaga, Cody Ross, Maybin, and Chris Coghlan, with occasional side trips to Emilio Bonifacio, DeWayne Wise, and more.By bailing out on the arbitration process, the Marlins cut themselves out from both continuity and, in some cases, the best part of a player’s career.Unfortunately, doing so may result in more uncertainty than clarity.The most common method involves looking at the actual production of players and comparing them to their salaries earned as free agents.The trouble is that general managers must offer a contract in advance of the player’s actual production, and such cumulative measures count contracts that look awful in hindsight as part of the average value.Indeed, this seems to accurately reflect the way teams pay for talent.However, the market’s valuation is not necessarily correct or ideal.Likewise, there is no single way to evaluate the success or failure of a free agent acquisition.In many, if not most cases, a free agent signing can only truly be evaluated after that contract ends, by which time the general manager who originally signed the player may have long since moved on.The draft, the third major method of player acquisition, might be the hardest of all by which to judge a general manager’s performance.Players enter the draft after either high school or college, and often are years away from actually appearing in a major league game.We need to know how much freedom a general manager has been given to operate, and how he has used that freedom.Inspired by Bill James’s manager in a box rubric, we came up with a set of questions to ask in order to gauge some of the peculiarities of general managers and their situations.We begin with some basic matters of background and record.

Epstein comes from a fascinating family background.Life on the Streets and In Treatment.He grew up not far from Fenway Park and played on the Brookline High School baseball team.In 1998, the Padres represented the National League in the World Series.When Lucchino took on an identical role with the Red Sox in 2002, he brought Epstein across the country to serve as an assistant general manager.During the 2002–2003 offseason, he was in the strange position of helping to search for Port’s replacement, the man who would become his new boss.When Beane balked at the last minute, the Sox turned to Epstein.The 2004championship was Boston’s first since 1918, breaking a legendary streak of failure and frustration.3rdWas This General Manager Able to Work Independently of Ownership, or Does Ownership Interfere in Baseball Operations?This was, at least initially, the case with Epstein.Epstein did return to the Red Sox, in January 2006, but only after owner John Henry granted him greater independence.Did He Generally Work for Teams That Spent Money, or Was HeControlled by a Tight Budget?In a sport without a salary cap, money is the single most valuable resource a general manager can have at his disposal.Epstein did not need to make a dollar go further or cut corners in other areas of management to afford his star player.Was He a Big Player in the Free Agent Market?Did He Spend Wisely?In this case, the most egregious example might be the John Lackey contract.Most, if not all, of 2012 is shot for the pitcher.Whether the Red Sox signed Lackey as a move in the arms race with the Yankees or because they truly believed he could become an ace alongside Josh Becket and John Lester might be up for debate, but what isn’t is that thus far it has been a less than stellar signing for the Red Sox.Matsuzaka is a cautionary tale of the care a team needs to take when acquiring a player whose experience is not college or minor league baseball, but instead another league entirely.Were TheyStrategic Innovators or Quieter Types?Little’s firing after failing to lift an exhausted Pedro Martinez from Game 7 of the 2003 American League Division Series has entered baseball par lance as one of the worst managerial blunders in postseason history.Francona, Epstein’s only actual managerial hire, had considerably more success, winning two World Series in his first four seasons with the team.Francona, better known as a player’s manager than as a tactician, had spent four seasons as the skipper of the Philadelphia Phillies, a tenure that resulted in four losing records and a seemingly overly deferential attitude towards ace pitcher Curt Schilling.Just as fans and managers will have their favorite types of players, so, too, will general managers have a type of player they prefer more than another.The trick here, then, might be not to laud the general manager who consistently signs flamethrowers or bashers, but the one who is most able to evaluate his team’s needs and sign the appropriate players.Many of the players acquired by Epstein were considered the best or near the best available talent at the time.Adrian Gonzalez was probably the best hitter available in the 2010–2011 offseason.Beckett became the staff ace after he was acquired, and veteran third baseman Mike Lowell, also part of the deal, gave the Sox four years of solid work as well.Thus, Epstein’s moves can be understood not just as attempting to nab the best talent possible, but also as attempting to have his lineup and rotation cater to a park well known for its quirks.How Much Emphasis Did He Put on Gloves?Given a Choicebetween a Slugger and a Glove Man, Which Would He Pick?The Red Sox rarely played a pure glove man during his tenure, but also rarely sacrificed defense for offense, coming closest in 2008 when he traded for Jason Bay to replace Manny Ramirez rather than keep speedster Jacoby Ellsbury in left field, and in 2011, when the acquisition of Adrian Gonzalez meant pushing Kevin Youkilis to third base.As part of that deal, Nomar Garciaparra’s superior bat went to the Cubs while Orlando Cabrera’s glove and superior durability came to Boston.On the whole, though, Epstein courted players who could do both.Curt Schilling and Matsuzaka did it once each.How Successful Was He at Building Bullpens?Relievers are a volatile lot, and all teams see a good deal of turnover in the bullpen.Otherwise, Epstein bullpens struggled with consistency and effectiveness.In all other seasons, the Red Sox ranked somewhere between eighth and 12th.How Much Emphasis Did He Put on Stocking His Benches?When it came to filling the bench and insuring some of his other gambles, Epstein’s bravura performance came during his first months on the job.The Sox had gone through the 2002 season without a regular first baseman or designated hitter, using a combination of Tony Clark, Brian Daubach, and Jose Offerman at the former position and Manny Ramirez, Carlo Baerga, Cliff Floyd, Daubach, and Offerman at the latter.Still not satisfied, Epstein made an audacious move by violating one of baseball’s oldest informal rules.He would never again play in the majors.Did He Try to Solve His Problems with Proven Players orwith Youngsters Who Still Have Something to Prove?Did He Make Many Trades?Epstein gambled that it would be better to have a clearly inferior but more durable shortstop in Orlando Cabrera than the offense Garciaparra would provide when and if he was healthy enough to play.Nomar hit the road on the July 31 trading deadline, a key moment in the eventual championship.Worst TradesWere His Teams Successful in the Draftand International Scouting?Clay Buchholz, Lester, and Pedroia are all among players who came up through the Red Sox farm system, and are, as of November 2011, all important pieces of the team.More substantively, Epstein hired Terry Francona as his manager.Conversely, they were 24th in stolen base attempts and last in sacrifice bunts.Throughout Epstein’s tenure, shortstop has been something of a black hole for the Red Sox.The Red Sox did have the potential solution to their shortstop problems in Hanley Ramirez, but during Epstein’s absence, Ramirez was traded in a package that landed the Red Sox Josh Beckett and Mike Lowell.Beckett and Lowell would be critical to the Red Sox’ 2007 World Series win.One would have a much harder time imagining the Yankees refusing to resign Derek Jeter or the Phillies parting with Ryan Howard, but with the exception of his commitment to Varitek, Epstein appears to lack the sentimentality gene.This was perhaps most visible in his allowing Martinez, Orlando Cabrera, and Derek Lowe to depart as free agents after the 2004 championship, a time when many teams are handing out foolish contracts to incumbent players as part of the World Series afterglow.The compensatory draft picks received as a result netted the team, among others, Jacoby Ellsbury and Clay Buchholz.If There Was No Professional Baseball, What Would He Be Doing?The numeric answer may not be necessary.At the end of the 2011 season, marred by the potentially greatest collapse in baseball history, allegations of beer and fried chicken in the clubhouse painted a portrait of a clubhouse not wholly united, a front that Epstein could not entirely control.Epstein should not be penalized because the roster he put together got bit by the injury bug equivalent of the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic.On the other hand, should he bear responsibility for the John Lackey signing, which, as of this writing, has been a bust?Moneyball had yet to go mainstream.Indeed, a general manager who does not take sabermetrics seriously would be just as incompetent as one who refused to use the farm system as a way to develop players or another who avoided the free agent market at all costs, not for a lack of money but because of a lack of inclination.Sabermetrics have gone mainstream.How Do Teams Like the Orioles, Pirates, and Royals Get Broken, and How Can They Be Fixed?In baseball, neither the boom years nor the lean years tend to last for very long.Perhaps advancing age renders some of its stars injured, ineffective, or too expensive to retain, exposing the team’s lack of ready replacements.Maybe another organization mounts a challenge and leaves it with less margin for error.The only questions are how long it can delay that decline, how far it will fall, and how long it will take to rejoin the race.Fortunately, for most teams, falling out of the first division is only a temporary setback, an ugly record that is not an omen of more bad times to come, but a sign that the next success is just around the corner.From 1900 through 2011, the average duration of a losing streak was 2.99 years, meaning that the average team that dipped below .500 following a season or seasons at or above .500 could expect to reach or surpass .500 again in just three seasons, hardly long enough for the natives to grow restless.Can their sordid pasts tell us anything about the tactics that teams should avoid if they hope to regain their winning ways quickly?However, certain examples are instructive, and there are some common themes.I mentioned earlier that age is often a factor in a formerly successful team’s exit from the winner’s circle.We’ve monkeyed around with older players in the belief that they would help us while we were finding young stars.Where do you get, sticking along with the veterans?The second division. But does youth always equal success?Average Ages of Good and Bad TeamsAs it turns out, too much inexperience can be even more toxic to a team than too much experience.All else being equal, a younger team is preferable to an older one, since younger players generally cost less and offer more room for improvement, but a roster composed of players who haven’t yet hit their primes is at least as unlikely to succeed as a team of players who’ve left their primes behind.What can we uncover if we examine the origins of each group of teams’ players instead of their ages?Even when the reserve clause was still in effect, young talent reigned supreme.The difference this time was that he had similarly talented players in line to replace them.Look at us, we build and win at the same time. Stengel’s boast wasn’t mere bravado.Under Stengel and Yankees general manager George Weiss, the Yankees never succumbed to the fatal entropy that so often dooms good teams, because almost year by year they integrated at least one young player per season into the lineup at the expense of a veteran.Stengel had succeeded in reshaping his team without breaking the underlying mold of a winner.Johnson had gotten into baseball in 1953 by purchasing both Yankee Stadium and Blues Stadium, the home of the Kansas City Blues, the Yankees’ top farm team.As one of the few owners whose income derived solely from baseball, he was hit hard by the Depression, he avoided building a farm system or delegating any responsibility for running the club long after most owners had invested in the minors and hired general managers, and he was fast approaching senility by the time he relinquished the team after half a century of some form of ownership.Nugent himself would have liked to field a competitive team but lacked the means.Without an owner who could and would pump up the team’s payroll, the Phillies were doomed to suffer two streaks of over 10 consecutive losing seasons.Carpenter, their fortunes predictably improved.