• There is a societal trend toward holding back children from starting school early.There is a growing, albeit controversial, belief in educational circles that kids who are among the oldest in their class do better academically than those who fall on the youngest end of the spectrum.This is why the results we get from pooling the data for all players from 1965 to 1996, without regard to the year they were drafted, might actually underestimate the advantage younger players have.We can safely say that the youngest 20 percent of high school hitters in any particular year will return, on average, about double what the oldest 20 percent of high school hitters will.We can sum up all the data above by performing a second linear regression, this time including a player’s age along with his pick number as variables.This means that there is less than a two percent chance that we would get data like this if there weren’t an actual correlation between age and expected return.This is a statistically significant result.Secondly, we can now estimate to what degree teams should be drafting younger players earlier.That is a massive, massive impact.They clearly don’t take age into account enough.The difference in value between a player born in, say, October and in April is the difference in value between the #100 pick and the #48 pick, or the difference between the #30 pick and the #19 pick.It’s hard to overstate the importance of this.I can’t say that major league teams have ignored age completely when drafting players, but age has clearly been subordinate to present talent, and this study argues strongly that this has been a mistake.As this data set ends with the 1996 draft, it is quite possible that the edge toward younger players has diminished if some teams have privately done their own research and realized the bonanza to be had in younger high school hitters.The average return from the youngest 20 percent of draft picks during this span was more than triple the return of the oldest 20 percent.From 1997 to 2003, 22 high school hitters drafted in the top 100 were at least 18 years, 293 days old.Much as I did with the data from 1965 to 1996, I performed a linear regression for the 1997 to 2003 data that included a player’s draft status and his age as variables.This isn’t surprising, because in the more recent data set, we’re only looking at how he played in the first eight years after he was drafted instead of the first 15, so his expected return should be lower.While we simply don’t have enough data to evaluate more recent drafts, Mike Trout and Jason Heyward are two powerful data points in support of the notion that the advantage toward younger high school hitters in the draft is still there, and teams ignore it at their own peril.Having proven that young high school hitters are an undervalued commodity in baseball, it logically proceeds to ask the question as to whether the same is true of young college hitters, or of pitchers of either type.There’s definitely a trend there, but it’s a lot less smooth than what we observed with high school hitters.The youngest and oldest players show only a modest effect, but the middle quartiles show a dramatic drop in return as the players get older.Monday had just completed his sophomore year and was still 19 years old.The average age of college players selected in the early years of the draft was significantly younger than those selected in later years, and as with high school hitters above, that may be making the true impact of age appear less than it really is.Another factor is that while most high draft picks out of college are selected as juniors, some players do not sign until after their senior year.We were not able to get comprehensive data on how many years of college every draft pick had completed, so we were unable to isolate only those players who were college juniors.This means that some of the oldest players in our draft set were taken as college seniors.However, the impact is not nearly as large.Relative to the value of the draft pick, the impact of age on a college hitter is roughly 52 percent as great as the impact on a high school hitter.The impact is small enough that it is not, in fact, statistically significant.Now, the fact that a result is not statistically significant is not the same as saying the result is not true.It simply means that it is possible the results we are seeing could have been caused by blind luck.We simply don’t have enough data to say what is the true cause one way or the other.One of the reasons why our results are not significant is that the sample size is smaller.While 846 high school hitters were drafted in the top 100 picks from 1965 to 1996, only 510 college hitters were selected.If we had the exact same results, but a larger data sample, the results might be statistically significant.Let’s say you had a weighted coin that landed heads 70 percent of the time.If you flipped it 10 times and got seven heads, that would not be statistically significant, because a perfectly fair coin could do the same thing.If you flipped it 100 times and got 70 heads, you’d be able to state with confidence that the coin was weighted.Same coin, same results, but a larger sample size makes all the difference.Given that we have seen a similar, but more dramatic, effect with high school hitters, there is reason to believe that the results we are seeing with college hitters is more likely than not to be real.Even if it is, though, the effect appears to be less than half as large.We can’t say with complete certainty that young college hitters are a market inefficiency, but the data is suggestive.So far, the data conforms to common sense pretty strongly.The youngest 20 percent of college pitchers were those younger than 20 years, 10 months at the time they were drafted.OldOnce again, the linear regression tells the story.This isn’t surprising, since historically college pitchers have not fared as well as college hitters in general.Relative to the value of the draft pick, the impact of age for college pitchers is almost identical to the impact for college hitters.As with college hitters, the results do not reach the level of statistical significance.If there’s a surprise here, it’s that among collegiate players, age is just as important for pitchers as it is for hitters.Intuitively, you wouldn’t suspect that to be the case.For one thing, pitchers at the age of 20 or 21 are so likely to suffer an arm injury that you might think you’d be better off drafting the slightly older pitcher, figuring that he’s already managed to get past his 21st birthday without suffering a catastrophic injury.He might get injured, but he is also far more likely to add velocity or master a breaking ball or something else that lets him take a step forward.High school pitchers who are particularly old continue to do poorly, but this time the youngest pitchers in the study do worst of all.The problem is, that’s about it.As you can imagine, the trend is so slight that it’s almost meaningless.That fails to reach not only statistical significance, but practical significance.The question is why this is so.Our model suggests that the younger the player, the more rapidly he is improving.Slight differences in age should be more important for high school players than college ones.Indeed, that’s exactly what we saw with hitters, but while age is as important for college pitchers as it is for college hitters, high school pitchers show no effect whatsoever.The most compelling answer resides with that youngest quintile of pitchers, the ones who screw up our perfect slope by underperforming their expectations most of all.Younger pitchers are still developing physically, and still perfecting their mechanics, making them significantly more likely to hurt their arms than older pitchers.With pitchers, the gradual improvement in skills as a player ages is being counteracted by the high risk of injury.What our data suggests is that once a pitcher reaches the age of 20, the risk of injury has diminished to the point where it’s overwhelmed by the potential for improvement.At the age of 17, however, the injury risk is more formidable than the odds of a breakthrough performance.Every team in baseball keeps its pitchers on pitch counts, and teenage pitchers in particular are monitored with a degree of caution that borders on paranoia.But if that’s the case, it might be 20 years before we have the data to prove it.High school hitters who are particularly young for their draft class produce a dramatically higher rate of return than their older classmates.This effect has persisted throughout the history of the draft, and is large enough that major league teams should adjust their drafting tendencies significantly to accommodate for it.College draft picks, both hitters and pitchers, show a similar tendency for younger players to outperform older ones.However, the effect is barely half that for high school hitters, and does not yet rise to the level of statistical significance.Still, it probably makes sense for major league teams to tweak their draft boards to bump younger players up a few slots.The risk of injury with high school pitchers appears to trump any age considerations.In particular, pitchers drafted before their 18th birthday have historically not fared well, and need to be handled with extreme caution to prevent injury.Yet it turns out one of the biggest market inefficiencies in all of baseball was right under their noses, and they don’t need to spend millions of dollars to obtain the information.All they need is a copy of a player’s driver’s license.It would take volumes to craft a representational image of all the complexities of the market.Many love prospecting in Latin America, but some fear it with equal passion.It’s the epicenter of the superstar and a market that some believe represents the future of the game.That head start on the developmental process affords teams more time to sculpt those physical gifts into baseball skills.When you take a superior athlete and get him into a professional developmental program at 16 rather than at 18 or 21, you increase your chances of building a monster.It’s an open system.The level of investment is without boundaries.If a team is willing to spend, cash is king.Top dollar buys access to top talent, allowing those willing to gamble an opportunity to win big.If you have the money, honey, players and buscones have the time.When the signing window opens on July 2 of every year, prospective teams have the opportunity to offer the aforementioned bonuses to the amateur athletes, who become eligible to sign a professional contract when they are 16 years old.This might be the biggest pro, as the sooner you get the talent into the development/cultural assimilation process, the better.You can still find value without paying the most money.Although money rules when it comes to the most obviously talented players, spending less doesn’t preclude the opportunity of finding value, because the market is so rich with immature talent.The sands of the market are littered with diamonds, and the cost to acquire a bucket of sand is still far less than any other traditional method of diamond excavation.Buscones are an amalgam of scout, agent, father figure, and underworld procurer.For those who are less scrupulous than others, finding financial gain by manipulating the system is easily accomplished.Sign with me and do what I say or suffer the consequences, be that a physical threat or a professional one.I’ve heard numerous stories about buscones who operate as figures in organized crime, extorting and controlling through intimidation and force.

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